Abstract
Introduction
Among all of the works of F. A. von Hayek, economists seem to have the most difficulty in understanding his cognitive theory as described in The Sensory Order. An unusual contribution, this book has so far received little attention and even less appreciation. Since its publication in 1952, Hayek has added a series of subsequent articles, such as Rules, Perception and Intelligibility (1963) , The Theory of Complex Phenomena (1964) , and The Primacy of the Abstract (1969) , where he elaborated in more detail on some specific issues raised in the preceding book. Despite this, Hayek's cognitive writings were typically ignored by economists.
Recently, and years after his death, a group of scholars Butos and Koppl, 2007; Birner, 1999 and Horwitz, 2000) have focused anew on Hayek's cognitive theory opening a fruitful discussion that now interprets Hayek's later work in the context of his early cognitive contributions.
Although hardly mainstream, the attempt to combine economics with psychology as
Camerer (2008) emphasizes, is not new. The roots of neuroeconomics can be traced back to Pareto (1897) . The neglect of psychological influences of neoclassical theory may well be due to the "pessimism of its time," accounting for treating the human mind as a black box (Camerer, 2008, p.357) . Today, fMRIs and related tools bring neuroscience and economics together and thus offer a new foundation for behavioral economics; this in spite of continuing skepticism about the usefulness of some of its results (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2005 ).
Hayek's The Sensory Order is a contribution to cognitive psychology, a branch of psychology that studies the fact that humans do not directly perceive impulses from the outside world, nor that they directly respond to them. Instead, human perception, thoughts, and actions are studied as the result of internal transformations and computations, originating from processes that are repeatedly carried out in the brain (Gazzaniga et al., 1997 ). Hayek's central argument in
The Sensory Order is that human perception and human action is a purely subjective phenomenon. The mind does not represent physical or external events but is an interpretation of these events that we call reality. In this paper I argue that Hayek's work on social evolution cannot be fully understood without relating it to his cognitive theory. [1] This, at first, may seem counterintuitive since we commonly think of cognitive processes taking place at an individual level, whereas the cultural point of view usually encompasses groups and societies as units of selection, rendering Hayek's social theory apparently inconsistent with the concept of methodological individualism (Vanberg, 1986) . Societies are not only subject to group selection but have developed through a process in which individuals choose the rules that form the social order. Rule-following behavior -conscious or not -is not restricted to its social aspect. By emphasizing dispositions as rules, both at the individual level (mind) and at the social level (group, society), Hayek's central argument on the significance of rule-following behavior permits a new interpretation of his social theory.
The discussion is organized as follows. Section two gives an overview of Hayek's cognitive theory. Section three focuses on the role of dispositions, and section four explains social evolution through the alteration of dispositions. Section five offers an application; section six a conclusion.
Hayek's cognitive theory in a nutshell
The aspect of the central nervous system that interests us most is its capacity to channel information. The channeling or classification of information occurs through "the transmission from neuron to neuron within the central nervous system" (Hayek, 1952, p.52) . This classification apparatus is of a dual nature. It has the quality of a 'map' as well as of a 'model'.
The map shows all possible neuronal connections, it reflects the static aspect [2] of the nervous system, which operates on impulses but exists "independently of the particular impulses proceeding in it at a particular time" (Hayek, 1952, p.115) . Static, used in this context, means semi-permanent: external effects may have an imprint on the central nervous system and may eventually change it. This option to extend the map through new connections has evolved during human history and still continues: new connections are formed during an individual's lifetime. [3] The model describes the "particular environment in which the organism finds itself at the moment," (Hayek, 1952, p.114) which means it resembles the current neuronal connections that a stimulus evokes. Essentially, in Hayek's view, neuronal connections will only take place when a stimulus can be brought into relation to another similar stimulus that has occurred in the past.
In this way, stimuli and combinations of them are identified as belonging to a certain class of stimuli. [4] If no such similarity can be established, no new stimulus can be perceived (Hayek, 1952, p. 64) . This view corresponds with the findings of recent cognitive theories as shown by LeDoux (2002, p.52) : an activity of a receiving neuron is triggered when a stimulus, the 'excitatory input' arrives in conjunction with another stimulus. A single stimulus is filtered out by inhibitory interneurons that prevent projection neurons to fire and therefore connect to the next neuron at the synapses. Inhibitory interneurons, writes Ledoux (2002, p. 49) "are involved in information processing within a given level of a hierarchical circuit. One of their main jobs is to regulate the flow of synaptic traffic."
Even if a single stimulus would arrive repeatedly at a receiving neuron, it would not trigger this neuron to fire. The map is, therefore, a reproduction of the relations of stimuli that occurred in the past, whereby "the past" refers to experience both of the species and of the single individual under consideration. [5] It mirrors a subjective explanation of the external world and shows the discrepancy between the physical and the phenomenal world. Hayek states explains the importance of the map as follows (Hayek, 1952, p.131) :
What the apparatus of classification provides is more a sort of inventory of the kind of things of which the world is built up, a theory of how the world works rather than a picture of it.
Hayek however locates different maps at different levels of the neuronal order. Lower level maps will "serve as a guidance of merely a limited range of responses, and at the same time act as filters or pre-selectors for the impulses sent on to the higher centers, for which, in turn, the maps of the lower levels constitute a part of the environment" (Hayek, 1952, p. 111) . That is, a very quick and predictable action refers to a category that operates on a 'lower level' such as the message 'fire is dangerous.' [6] An action that follows a stimulus that is more complex such as 'the teacher doesn't look at me. Should I cheat or should I refrain from cheating because cheating is bad per se?' will be the result of a multiple categorization. In fact, as Hayek describes it, it involves multi-level categorization (Hayek, 1952, p. 92 ):
While it is on the whole more likely that responses via the lowest centres will be innate for the individual, that is, acquired by the race in the course of evolution, while the responses effected by the higher centres will be largely based on individual experience, this cannot be regarded as a universal rule. Probably some inherited responses are effected on fairly high levels, while some learned responses may, after sufficient repetition, become almost completely automatic and be effected at low levels.
The process of classification has one important feature: the original stimulus can never be perceived by the individual in its pure form, but only in a categorized, classified, or abstract way.
We never perceive all the objective properties of a stimulus but "only certain 'aspects', relations to other kinds of objects which we assign to all elements of the classes in which we place the perceived objects" (Hayek, 1952, p.143) .
Stimuli brought into connection with past experience lead to what we call perception.
Hayek (1952, p. 143 ) speaks of 'abstract perception.' Abstract perception is never accurate since it is rooted in past perception, which put stimuli into a certain class. Stimuli do not give us an exhaustive list of qualities of the objects, but at the phenomenological level we perceive them as stimuli belonging to a class of stimuli we know from the past. In modern cognitive science (Gazzaniga et al., 2002, p. 205) this phenomenon is called object constancy. People are able to recognize a bicycle when seen from above or able to discern the essential features of objects that are otherwise strange: pink elephants for example, or striped apples. Older stimuli act therefore as "molds" for new incoming stimuli.
The following section will show that individuals may put a stimulus into different relations or classes at different times: the models can be changed constantly, in adaptation to current environments.
3
The core element of cognitive processes: the dispositions Stimuli do not evoke predictable reactions. When responding to a stimulus, different people act differently, and some do not react at all. Moreover, the same stimulus may be answered by the same individual differently at different times. The explanation for this phenomenon lies in human 'dispositions.' A disposition describes an inclination of an organism to react in a certain way when exposed to stimuli (Hayek, [1969 (Hayek, [ ] 1978 . The organism is not only prepared to react to a perceived stimulus in a certain way, its perception also prepares it to expect to receive future stimuli. That is, it expects to perceive stimuli that relate to stimuli perceived earlier, as well as it expects itself and other individuals to react in a certain way (Hayek, 1952, p.98) .
In an interview (Weimer and Palermo, 1982, p. 290) , "The Sensory Order after 25 years,"
Hayek refers in particular to the role of dispositions:
It seems to me now that I could have greatly simplified my exposition in the book if I had throughout used the term disposition. Perhaps I refrained from doing so because I feared then that it would be understood as referring primarily to dispositions to act or to move,
whereas of course what I had in mind were as much dispositions to interpret further stimuli and dispositions to change dispositions and also various long chains where dispositions succeed other dispositions, with actions coming in at a very late stage only as potential events that might have been produced if certain other stimuli had occurred.
Here Hayek clarifies that dispositions are not limited to rules of action, where action is understood as the last step in the cognitive process, but also refer to rules of perception. The most comprehensive treatment of dispositions is given in Hayek's 1963 article "Rules, Perception and Intelligibility" which deals in depth with dispositions as rules of perception.
Rules of perception refer to the rules that other people follow; the human mind thus perceives the rules of action of other people (Hayek, 1967, p. 45) . Without this ability, the interaction between mind and society would remain unidirectional, going from mind to society, without any feedback from society to mind.
The relation of rules of perception and rules of action is shown in Hayek's "Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules of Conduct" (1967, p. 45) . Movement patterns are used to exemplify a disposition to act:
From these instances where action is guided by rules (movement patterns, ordering principles, etc.) which the acting person need not explicitly know (be able to specify, discursively to describe, or 'verbalize'), and where the nervous system appears to act as what may be called a 'movement pattern effector', we must now turn to the corresponding and no less interesting instances where the organism is able to recognize actions conforming to such rules or patterns without being consciously aware of the elements of these patterns, and therefore must be presumed to possess also a kind of 'movement pattern detector'.
In this example, the neuronal system is seen as an organism that is both able to perceive patterns and to act according to patterns. The interesting question is then which pattern will we perceive and which action pattern will we follow as the neuronal system offers a huge variety of possible classifications of stimuli, and therefore, of patterns. Hayek differentiates between dispositions that an individual uses first and dispositions that he uses in addition to them. A classified stimulus will not evoke a specific response but a tendency toward a class of responses or a response "possessing certain properties" ([1969]1978, p.40) . It is not until this first or primary disposition gives a rough direction that other dispositions will overlap this first very general and abstract disposition. Overlapping dispositions are "adaptations to typical features of the environment" ([1969]1978, p. 41) . [7] Abstract rules of action operate "thus as moulds into which the various effects upon it [the organism] of the external world are fitted" ([1969] 1978, p.
41).
The sensory or phenomenal order is based on rules that have the following characteristics: they can be innate (genetic material), they can be acquired by personal experience, and they can be based upon the experience of the human species adopted during several stages of cultural evolution.
It is this triplet of characteristics which ensures that individuals behave similarly but still remain 'personalities' and are therefore by no means 'rule-following animals'. The way an individual classifies a stimulus cannot be predicted; the subjective aspect of individual experience makes any prediction impossible. The same holds for individual responses to stimuli.
As Hayek states in "Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules of Conduct" ([1967] 1967, p.:68) : The concrete individual action will always be the joint effect of internal impulses, such as hunger, the particular external events acting upon the individual (including the actions of other members of the group), and the rules applicable to the situation thus determined." Put differently, an observer cannot know what the internal impulses of another individual are; nor can he state how strong they are, nor can the observer know the impact of an external event since each individual has his own personal experience and has formed his own neuronal pathways.
However, it is not completely impossible to predict a single, concrete action because of the phylogenetic quality of dispositions. [8] During human evolution, our species has acquired some hard-wired dispositions, such as helping one's kin or helping the old or the sick (Rubin, 2002) .
Besides these rules that are common to all individuals, there are dispositions that can be found only in particular societies, and that are difficult to understand for members of other societies, for example, the rites of initiation for African women. These dispositions can be thought of traditional rules and values embodied in this society during millennia.
Both the hard-wired dispositions and those dispositions referring to cultural uniqueness constitute the individual neuronal map. They are the primary dispositions or abstract rules which the individual will refer to in the first place before taking any action. These rules, passed on through generations, have no specific purpose but build the very frame of a society and make general predictions of behavior ("pattern prediction") possible. Traditional rules or primary dispositions embody knowledge that individuals are not typically aware of -knowledge about how to do things in a way best adapted to the environment. Traditional rules store the knowledge and the experience of the past, or, as Birner (2005, p. 12) stresses, the "wisdom of ages." They incorporate the knowledge that exists in "formulas, symbols, and rules whose meaning we do not understand and through the use of which we avail ourselves of the assistance of knowledge which individually we do not possess" (Hayek, [1945 . These relatively stable parts of the neuronal map are complemented by personal experience of the individual. Perception is a process rooted in experience and is therefore 'coloured' by that past experience (Hayek, 1952, p. 98) . The information received together with a stimulus is of a personal nature and since it was categorized, it cannot be called 'objective.' [9] Actions based upon this information will trigger a feedback that eventually increases the knowledge of the individual: his dispositions -primary as well as overlapping − will be reinforced or altered by adapting them to the past event. An important consequence of this process is that knowledge is personal and therefore subjective and dispersed.
In this light 'dispersed knowledge' leads to a new interpretation: Hayek stresses that it is the part of the map which is shaped by individual experience that is the reason for dispersed knowledge. More precisely, Hayek emphasizes that "the concrete knowledge which guides the action of any group of people never exists as a consistent and coherent body. It only exists in the dispersed, incomplete, and inconsistent form in which it appears in many individual minds" ([1952a], 1979, p. 49, 50) . We rely on this limited, subjective knowledge when interacting with other people as well as we rely on knowledge embodied in primary dispositions. This latter knowledge is taken into consideration when we activate so-called 'mirror-neurons' (Gazzaniga et al., 1997, p. 469 ) using our own classificatory system to explain the behavior of others. We expect people to respond in a certain way to certain stimuli not only because we explain their behavior using our own classifications, [10] but also because we have learned that certain dispositions are prevalent in the environment we know. The probability of seeing expected behavior in a known social environment is higher than in an unfamiliar one. Stated differently: it is easier (and less prone to mistake) to perceive the rules of action of other individuals in a familiar environment than to perceive the rules of action of individuals with different traditions.
Of course, the individually shaped dispositions add uncertainty to the presumed security of a known environment. Subjective and dispersed knowledge connects to the knowledge embedded in traditional rules or primary dispositions. In the next section we will see how rules can evolve and how individual and societal knowledge can increase and thereby spur social evolution.
Social evolution as evolution of dispositions
Hayek's emphasis on group selection, understood as the selection process in cultural evolution, has so far generated a large literature (Vanberg, 1986); Hodgson, 1991; Zywicky, 2000 and Whitman, 2004) that aims at bridging the gap between methodological individualism and group selection.
I argue that Hayek has delivered a framework that permits us to re-evaluate groupselection from a new perspective. Already Langlois (2004, p. 263) Mind and social order are in constant interaction since classification is embedded in the social structure.
[12] The mind is both product as well as producer of cultural evolution.
Dispositions link the mental to the social order. The social order is built on rules that the human mind will perceive and to which it will react. On the other hand, individuals are endowed with 'dispositions to change dispositions', permitting them to develop new rules of action eventually altering the social order.
Cultural evolution, seen as the change of the social order, takes place in two steps. First, an individual realizes an inconsistency between his use of dispositions (rules of action) and the expected results from his actions. As Vromen (1995p, 164) correctly observes, expectations can be frustrated due to unusual changes in the 'natural' environment as well as alterations in the 'social' environment "because of unforeseen changes in the behaviour of others."
Inconsistencies between the expected and the actual results of his actions can be solved either consciously or unconsciously; small unintended violations of rules and practices will allow the inconsistencies disappear. Individuals who change their behavior change their dispositions as well; they alter and add knowledge that is stored in their dispositions. Since the neuronal map of the individual offers more options to react to stimuli, a learning process in form of trial and error will result in the selection of a different disposition, or in the development of a new one, therefore leading to new neuronal connections and to an alteration of the neuronal map.
[13]
The generation of a new disposition is "always a discovery of something which already guides its [the mind's] operation." [14] To state it differently: even a new disposition needs to be brought into relation with stimuli that occurred in the past and needs to be compared with an established pattern of action. The new rule of action that an individual uses will be observed by other members of his group. If this deviation from the common rules (the main dispositions) of action proves to be successful, he will be imitated by others. Vromen distinguishes furthermore between 'within-group imitation' and 'between-group imitation' (Vromen, 1995, pp. 172, 173) .
The more individuals follow the new rule of action the more likely the new rule will become part of the social order. It is possible that an individual is not allowed to deviate since breaking a widely respected rule is usually subject to punishment by other members of the society. This tendency to conservatism, of course, contributes to the relative stability of the social order. The 'innovative' individual needs to evaluate the costs of breaking the rules in question. He may give up on following a new rule or, in order to escape punishment, he may migrate to a group or to a society ('between-group migration') that either already practices the new rule or offers more tolerance towards deviators.
[15]
A new disposition or rule of action first established by one member of the group and later followed by a sufficiently large number of other group members changes the social order. Note that this first step in cultural evolution has brought about a new rule, embodied now in the remaining system of rules. This single rule therefore had an impact on the social order. The next step focuses on this altered social order. Hume's 'slow test of time' will tell which social order is better adapted to the environment. In the end those groups or societies using a set of rules adequately adapted to their environment will survive and thrive.
Thus, cultural evolution is the result of an active process of exchange between the phenomenological order and the social order whereby an individual's perception of rules and his action according to rules is the key element. We may therefore conclude with Hayek (1979, p. 156) that: "[m]ind and culture developed concurrently and not successively."
The role of government in the process of social evolution
So far, we have stressed the importance of individual action with respect to the development of rules of behavior. We have described social evolution as a result of individual action, followed by both within-group selection and group selection. This section adds an analysis of rules that can be deliberately set by government, together with an explanation of the role of dispositions in establishing a legal framework.
Hayek's emphasis on restricting governmental action because of the knowledge problem can be better understood if we bridge his theory of an ideal government with his cognitive theory.
Following the Scottish moral philosophy, Hayek defines government as a "government of law and not of men or of will." That is, the government acts like any other member in the society, in accordance with the legal framework that has largely emerged spontaneously.
[16] Such a legal framework provides the 'rules of the game' that are valid for every member of the society and therefore for government, too. It consists of the rules of just conduct, those general principles that -as Hayek ([1944] 1994, p. 80) writes − enable members of society "to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge". The similarity between the 'general legal rules' and the rules of perception and action is no coincidence as they are both part of the system of rules that form the social order but are of explicit nature. These rules determine the conditions under which the available resources may be used but they do not tell the individual for what ends they should be used. Examples of such rules can be found in private and criminal law. In addition, there are rules of public law as well as rules that are not legally set but nevertheless obeyed such as moral and customary rules. All these rules form the framework for individual and governmental actions and form the backbone of the social order.
[17]
The position of government is a particular one: government plays the role of a 'primus inter pares,' or 'first among equals,' with the duty to protect the legal framework so that a spontaneous order may develop further. Judges, for example, have the duty of 'finding' the law by looking at the consistency of rules, legal as well as traditional. There are parallels between the development of new dispositions and the 'finding' of a new legal rule. This is no coincidence:
legal rules are rules of behavior that are part of a larger set of social rules. As much as new dispositions need to be developed on the basis of already existing dispositions, a new legal rule can only be discovered if it fits the rest of the rules. Accordingly, judges use 'immanent criticism' [18] the same way as private individuals do. If none of the existing general rules of behavior fulfills the needs of a situation, the judge may alter an existing rule or develop a new rule capable of overcoming inconsistencies (Hayek, 1973, pp. 118, 119) . The judge is not seen as "the creator of a new order but a servant endeavouring to maintain and improve the functioning of the existing order" (Hayek, 1973, p. 119 ). This process is not dissimilar to the development of a new rule of action in Hayek's cognitive theory. A new legal rule, now part of a given framework, will become part of the individuals' set of dispositions. While both individuals and judges spur the process of social evolution, the main difference between them lies in the coercive power that government has in implementing a new rule. Hayek emphasizes that "coercion is justified only in order to provide such a framework within which all can use their abilities and knowledge for their own ends so long as they do not interfere with the equally protected individual domains of others" (Hayek, 1979, p. 139) . In order to achieve this goal he elaborates a model constitution that secures a division of powers between two different and mutually independent representative bodies (Hayek, 1979, p. 109) . The Legislative Assembly lays down the rules of just conduct as explained above. The Governmental Assembly, finally, cannot "issue any orders to private citizens which did not follow directly and necessarily from the rules laid down by the former [Legislative Assembly] (Hayek, 1979, p. 119) . The social order is thereby a result of rules that are followed by individuals and, when stressing the importance of the role of government in affecting this order. Hayek refers to rules that are deliberately altered, improved or set anew. The resulting order is of a spontaneous character, since government introduces only rules that have no explicit end, the rules of law and of just conduct. These deliberately-set rules will fit into the existing order, with judges finding new rules in order "[t]o maintain and improve the functioning of an existing order" (Hayek, 1979, p. 119) . We may argue that these deliberately-set rules will become part of an individual's main dispositions.
However, which actions the individual will choose depends on the circumstances it finds itself in. Rules may well be set deliberately; the resulting social order is subject both to in-group selection and group selection.
Conclusion
The paper illuminates Hayek's work on social evolution and the role of government from a cognitive standpoint. The tool to do that is the term 'disposition'. As Hayek stressed late in his life, the term 'disposition' is helpful to clarify his cognitive writings. In taking this hint the paper has set out to connect the phenomenological order and the social order with the help of dispositions.
In doing so, I have stressed the validity of Hayek's cognitive theory laid down in The Sensory Order as well as in his later cognitive writings in the light of new contributions in cognitive psychology. Although Hayek could not rely on the many tools that are available to current neuroscience, his cognitive theory shows some remarkable results. This paper thus adds a new explanation to why knowledge is dispersed, and how knowledge can emerge in a process that connects individual actions to the social order. Individuals are thought here of being actively involved in both the sensory and the social order, as they alter the society in which they live, given their restricted cognitive framework. This argument, as the last section has pointed out, is at the core of Hayek's rejection of planned economies.
The main outcome of connecting Hayek's cognitive theory with his social theory is that because of the sensory order, categorization is a successful tool to make individual behavior dependent of individual perception. As illuminated in this paper, individuals perceive the patterns of rules that underlie the society in which they live. This is where 'path-dependency' has its place. Since government is composed of individuals who are subject to the same cognitive restrictions as everyone else in society, Hayek call for politics without discretionary measures, implying a plea for a strict division of powers. Hayek's normative view is in favor of a society governed by general rules, an arrangement conducive to the transfer of knowledge from society to every single individual. In that sense, legal rules and other set rules (explicit knowledge) set by government complement traditional rules (implicit knowledge).
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Earlier versions of this paper have been presented to the Colloquium on Market and Institutions at New York University and to the Workshop in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at George Hayek (1978:40) gives a clarifying example: "The particular movement of, say, a lion jumping on the neck of his prey, will be one of a range of movements in the determination of which account will be taken not only of direction, distance and speed of movement of the prey, but also of the state of the ground (whether smooth or rough, hard or soft), whether it is covered or open territory, the state of fitness of the lion's various limbs-all being present as dispositions together with its disposition to jump." The disposition to jump is in this case the abstract rule of action or primary disposition which is 'superimposed' by the other overlapping disposition that the lion takes into account before jumping.
[8] See Hayek (1952:42) : "It will be contended that in the course of its phylogenetic and ontogenetic development the organism learns to build up a system of differentiations between stimuli in which each stimulus is given a definite place in an order, a place which represents the significance which the occurrence of that stimulus in different combinations with other stimuli has for the organism." See also Gazzaniga et al (2002:547) : "Choosing how to act does not simply require discriminating between incoming stimuli. When choosing how to act, we must integrate incoming stimuli with our values, current goals, emotional state, and social situation….The orbitofrontal cortex seems to be especially important for processing, evaluating, and filtering social and emotional information. The result is that damage to this region impairs the ability to make decisions that require feedback from social or emotional cues." [9] This refers to the argument of Hayek that social science is not a natural science. (Hayek [1952a [10] Hayek ([1942 : "In discussing what we regard as other people's conscious actions, we invariably interpret their action on the analogy of our own mind: that is, that we group their actions, and the objects of their actions, into classes or categories which we know solely from the knowledge of our mind."
[11] Translated [EG] from "Die ueberschaetzte Vernunft" (1982) in Die Anmassung von Wissen (1996) .
[12] Howard (225): "Social structures can neither emerge nor be sustained without human cognition: human cognition can be practiced only through situated social activity."
[13] Hayek (1952:95) : "In the first instance, the sensory representation of the environment, and of the possible goal to be achieved in his environment, will evoke a movement pattern generally aimed at the achievement of the goal. But at first the pattern of movement initiated will not be fully successful. The current sensory reports about what is happening will be checked against expectations, and the difference between the two will act as a further stimulus indicating the required corrections. The result of every step in the course of actions will, as it were, be evaluated against the expected results, and any difference will serve as an indicator of the corrections required." [14] Hayek ([1969] 1978:46) and Hayek ([1969 Hayek ([ ] 1978 : "…the richness of the sensory world in which we live…is…the product of a great range of abstractions which the mind must possess in order to be capable of experiencing that richness of the particular." [15] The possibility of deviation depends on the degree of reputation as Hayek (1979, p.204; Fn.48) says: "Though present morals evolved by selection, this evolution was not made possible by a license to experiment but on the contrary by strict restraints which made changes of the whole system impossible and granted tolerance to the breaker of accepted rules, who may have turned out a pioneer, only when he did so at his own risk and had had earned such license by his strict observation of most rules which alone could gain him the esteem which legitimized experimentation in a particular direction." See also Vromen (1995) .
